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Single Idea 2848

[from 'Emotivism' by David O. Brink, in 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism ]

Full Idea

Critics of emotivism claim that moral agreement need not track agreement in attitude; moralists with the same attitude can disagree in their views, and they can hold the same view while disagreeing in attitude.

Gist of Idea

Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement

Source

David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224)

Book Reference

'Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy', ed/tr. Audi,Robert [CUP 1995], p.224


A Reaction

Thus two racists can disagree about how racists should behave. Sounds like a good criticism.