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Single Idea 3310

[from 'Metaphysics: the logical approach' by José A. Benardete, in 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events ]

Full Idea

Once we conceded that Tom can walk slowly or quickly, and that the slowness and quickness is a property of the walking and not of Tom, we can hardly refrain from quantifying over events (such as 'a walking') in our ontology.

Gist of Idea

If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist

Source

José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6)

Book Reference

Benardete,José A.: 'Metaphysics: The Logical Approach' [OUP 1989], p.36