Full Idea
Ryle is tough-minded to the point of incoherence when he combines a dispositional account of the mind with an anti-realist account of dispositions.
Clarification
A 'disposition' is potential behaviour, or a tendency to behave in a certain way.
Gist of Idea
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real
Source
comment on Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.22
Book Reference
Benardete,José A.: 'Metaphysics: The Logical Approach' [OUP 1989], p.176
A Reaction
A nice point, but it strikes me that Ryle was, by temperament at least, an eliminativist about the mind, so the objection would not bother him. Maybe a disposition and a property are the same thing?