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Single Idea 4325

[from 'On Virtue Ethics' by Rosalind Hursthouse, in 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs ]

Full Idea

In contemporary philosophy of action, there is a fervid debate about whether any intentional action must be prompted in part by desire, or whether it is possible to be moved to action by a belief alone.

Gist of Idea

Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient?

Source

Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro)

Book Reference

Hursthouse,Rosalind: 'On Virtue Ethics' [OUP 2001], p.15


A Reaction

I want a cool belief to be sufficient to produce an action, because it will permit at least a Kantian dimension to ethics, and make judgement central, and marginalise emotivism, which is the spawn of Satan.