back to ideas for this text


Single Idea 4372

[from 'Nicomachean Ethics' by Aristotle, in 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will ]

Full Idea

According to Aristotle, the incontinent person never acts against active knowledge of particulars, but either acts against knowledge that is possessed but not exercised, or knowledge that is not fully possessed, or against knowledge of universals alone.

Clarification

'Akrasia' is lack of self-control

Gist of Idea

Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it

Source

comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b15) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 2.1

Book Reference

Achtenberg,Deborah: 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics' [SUNY 2002], p.24


A Reaction

This comments aims to bring Aristotle closer to Socrates (who says virtue IS reason), and it certainly fits with the high value which Aristotle normally places on reason.