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Single Idea 4595

[from 'Philosophy of Mind' by John Heil, in 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique ]

Full Idea

Any attempt to say what behaviour follows from a given state of mind can be shown to be false by producing an example in which the state of mind is present but, owing to the addition of new beliefs and desires, the behaviour does not follow.

Gist of Idea

No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene

Source

John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.64


A Reaction

The objection seems misplaced against eliminative behaviourism, because there are held to be no mental states to correlate with the behavior. There is just behaviour, some times the same, sometimes different.