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Single Idea 4717

[from 'Relativism' by Paul O'Grady, in 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic ]

Full Idea

There may be no way to avoid scepticism about meaning if you abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction in the way Quine does.

Gist of Idea

If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable

Source

Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3)

Book Reference

O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.80


A Reaction

My suspicion was always that Quine's proposal began the slippery road to hell. It appears to be pragmatists who are most drawn to Quine's idea. The proposal that all my analytic propositions could be treated as synthetic totally baffles me.

Related Idea

Idea 8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]