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Single Idea 5130

[from 'Nicomachean Ethics' by Aristotle, in 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques ]

Full Idea

One might ask: what on earth do you mean by speaking of the thing-itself? - assuming the definition of man is one and the same both in man and in man-himself; for qua man they will not differ at all.

Clarification

'Qua' means 'as'; 'man qua man' means 'man as pure man', rather than (say) man-as-postman

Gist of Idea

It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man'

Source

Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a32)

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.70


A Reaction

Effectively applies Ockham's Razor to the Forms. Do they add anything to our ability to explain? A particular man will have red hair, but a definition of man will mention properties shared by all men. But doesn't man-himself indicate what is essential?