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Single Idea 5513

[from 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)' by John Locke, in 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity ]

Full Idea

Kant thought that personal identity could not simply consist in sameness of consciousness, since someone's consciousness might be qualitatively similar to that of someone else who had existed previously.

Gist of Idea

Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough

Source

comment on John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason

Book Reference

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.60


A Reaction

An interesting point, which leads to the question of whether two conscious events must by type-identical or token-identical to confer identity over time. Locke implies type- (which leads to Kant's objection). He needed, but couldn't have, token-.