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Single Idea 5539

[from 'Critique of Pure Reason' by Immanuel Kant, in 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth ]

Full Idea

The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is agreement of cognition with its objects, is here granted and presupposed; but one demands to know what is the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition.

Gist of Idea

We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects

Source

Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B082/A58)

Book Reference

Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed/tr. Guyer,P /Wood,A W [CUO 1998], p.197


A Reaction

I am puzzled by the second part of this, as the demand for a criterion (or justification) seems to me to have no part at all in our notion of what truth is in itself. It is a puzzle that Kant seems to accept the concept of truth used by simple realists.