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Single Idea 5644

[from 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)' by Georg W.F.Hegel, in 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers ]

Full Idea

The terms of Hegel's logic are not judgements or propositions, but rather concepts: and it is concepts, in this view, that are true or false.

Gist of Idea

In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false

Source

report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.12

Book Reference

Scruton,Roger: 'A Short History of Modern Philosophy' [ARK 1985], p.168


A Reaction

Quite alien to normal studies of logic, but I can make sense of a correspondence theory of truth for concepts, which might be more interesting than normal propositional or predicate logic. Does the concept of, say, a 'natural law' correspond to anything?