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Single Idea 5679

[from 'Intro to Contemporary Epistemology' by Jonathan Dancy, in 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique ]

Full Idea

There is doubt about whether our experience of the world is such that we can conceive of the sort of separation of primary and secondary qualities which the scientific view calls for, and can understand what the world is like with no secondary qualities.

Gist of Idea

We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like

Source

Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.3)

Book Reference

Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.149


A Reaction

Dancy attributes these doubts to Berkeley (e.g. Idea 3837). I think what is claimed here is false. Obviously we spend our whole lives immersed in secondary qualities, but separating the different aspects is precisely what scientists (and philosophers) do.

Related Idea

Idea 3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]