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Single Idea 5690

[from 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)' by David M. Armstrong, in 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection ]

Full Idea

For Armstrong, introspection involves a belief, and mental states and their accompanying beliefs are 'distinct existences', so a state without belief shows states are not self-intimating, and the belief without the state shows beliefs aren't infallible.

Clarification

'Self-intimation' is a mental state being obvious to its possessor

Gist of Idea

A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility

Source

report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection

Book Reference

'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.396


A Reaction

I agree with Armstrong. Introspection is a two-level activity, which animals probably can't do, and there is always the possibility of a mismatch between the two levels, so introspection is neither self-intimating nor infallibe (though incorrigible).