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Single Idea 5736

[from 'Modality' by Joseph Melia, in 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts ]

Full Idea

Some philosophers say that modal facts cannot be expressed either by name/predicate language, or by first-order predicate calculus, or even by second-order logic.

Clarification

'Modal' facts concern possibility and necessity

Gist of Idea

No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly

Source

Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2)

Book Reference

Melia,Joseph: 'Modality' [Acumen 2003], p.21


A Reaction

If 'possible' were a predicate, none of this paraphernalia would be needed. If possible worlds are accepted, then the quantifiers of first-order predicate calculus will do the job. If neither of these will do, there seems to be a problem.