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Single Idea 5762

[from 'The Consolations of Philosophy' by Boethius, in 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism ]

Full Idea

If the wicked obtained what they want - that is goodness - they could not be wicked.

Gist of Idea

The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it

Source

Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.II)

Book Reference

Boethius: 'The Consolations of Philosophy', ed/tr. Watts,V.E. [Penguin 1969], p.119


A Reaction

This is a nice paradox which arises from Boethius being, like Socrates, an intellectualist. The question is whether the wicked want the good de re or de dicto. If they wanted to good de re (as its true self) they would obviously not be wicked.