back to ideas for this text


Single Idea 5905

[from 'The Right and the Good' by W. David Ross, in 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure ]

Full Idea

On reflection it seems clear that pleasure is not the only thing in life that we think good in itself, that for instance we think the possession of a good character, or an intelligent understanding of the world, as good or better.

Gist of Idea

We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure

Source

W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II)

Book Reference

Ross,W.David: 'The Right and the Good' [OUP 1930], p.17


A Reaction

Aristotle and Plato would obviously agree with this. I agree, as I cannot comprehend the claim that pleasure is self-evidently the good, simply because it feels nice. Why shouldn't evil feel nice?