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Single Idea 6058

[from 'Logical Properties' by Colin McGinn, in 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity ]

Full Idea

Identity propositions are not always analytic or a priori (as Frege long ago taught us) so there is nothing trivial about such propositions; the claim of redundancy ignores the epistemic role that the concept of identity plays.

Gist of Idea

Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)

Book Reference

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.13


A Reaction

He is referring to Frege's Morning Star/Evening Star distinction (Idea 4972). Wittgenstein wanted to eliminate our basic metaphysics by relabelling it as analytic or tautological, but his project failed. Long live metaphysics!

Related Idea

Idea 4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]