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Single Idea 6065

[from 'Logical Properties' by Colin McGinn, in 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence ]

Full Idea

The problems of the orthodox view are made vivid by analysis of the sentence 'something exists'; this is meaningful and true, but what property are we saying is instantiated here?

Gist of Idea

We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.2)

Book Reference

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.27


A Reaction

A very nice point. McGinn claims that existence is a property, a very generalised one. Personally I don't think anyone is even remotely clear what a property is, so the whole discussion is a bit premature. Must properties have causal powers?