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Single Idea 6265

[from 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' by Hilary Putnam, in 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth ]

Full Idea

What Tarski has done is to give us a perfectly correct account of the formal logic of the concept 'true', but the formal logic of the concept is not all there is to the notion of truth.

Gist of Idea

Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept

Source

Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro)

Book Reference

Putnam,Hilary: 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' [RKP 1981], p.4


A Reaction

I find this refreshing. A lot of modern philosophers seem to think that truth is no longer an interesting philosophical topic, because deflationary accounts have sidelined it, but I take the concept to be at the heart of metaphysics.