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Single Idea 6365

[from 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)' by J Pollock / J Cruz, in 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification ]

Full Idea

The regress argument has no apparent strength against negative coherence theories, because they do not require reasons for beliefs.

Clarification

In 'negative' theories, beliefs are accepted unless reasons suggest rejection

Gist of Idea

Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem

Source

J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3)

Book Reference

Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.73


A Reaction

A nice point. Such theories endorse Neurath's picture (Idea 6348). On the whole philosophers like positive support for their beliefs, so the rather passive picture of accepting everything unless it is undermined is not appealing. A fall-back position.

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