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Single Idea 6410

[from 'On the Nature of Acquaintance' by Bertrand Russell, in 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential ]

Full Idea

Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.

Clarification

A 'definite description' has the form 'the so-and-so'

Gist of Idea

The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2

Book Reference

Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.35


A Reaction

This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.