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Single Idea 6457

[from 'Collins Dictionary of Philosophy' by Godfrey Vesey, in 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data ]

Full Idea

Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent.

Gist of Idea

Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent

Source

Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266)

Book Reference

Angeles,Peter A.: 'A Dictionary of Philosophy' [Harper 1981], p.266


A Reaction

This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical.