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Single Idea 6808

[from 'Philosophy of Science' by Alexander Bird, in 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds ]

Full Idea

I propose that reference to scientific terms, such as natural kinds and theoretical terms, is not determined by a sense or description attached to the term, but by its explanatory role.

Gist of Idea

Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions

Source

Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.8)

Book Reference

Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.289


A Reaction

He gives the example of an electron, which had the same role in electrical theory, despite changes in understanding its nature. One might talk of its 'natural' (causal) role, rather than its 'explanatory' role (which implies a human viewpoint).