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Single Idea 6947

[from 'The Fixation of Belief' by Charles Sanders Peirce, in 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems ]

Full Idea

Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe.

Gist of Idea

Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15)

Book Reference

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.15


A Reaction

This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs.