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Single Idea 7437

[from 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory'' by David M. Armstrong, in 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness ]

Full Idea

Consciousness and experience of qualities are often run together - a serious mistake, I think.

Gist of Idea

Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same

Source

David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvii)

Book Reference

Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-7


A Reaction

A difficult claim to evaluate. Can we experience redness without being conscious of it? Could there be consciousness (e.g. of concepts) which didn't involve any qualities? I suspect that qualities are more basic than intentionality or consciousness.