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Single Idea 7734

[from 'Db (ideas)' by PG, in 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability ]

Full Idea

To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept.

Gist of Idea

Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's

Source

PG (Db (ideas) [2031])


A Reaction

But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant.