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Single Idea 7854

[from 'Thinking about Consciousness' by David Papineau, in 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness ]

Full Idea

Our phenomenal concepts are irredeemably vague in certain dimensions, in ways that preclude there being any fact of the matter about whether octopuses feel phenomenal pain, or silicon-based humanoids would have any phenomenal consciousness.

Gist of Idea

Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §7)

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.11


A Reaction

It would be hard for Papineau to prove this point, but clearly our imagination finds it very hard to grasp the idea of a thing which is 'somewhat conscious'. The concept of being much more conscious than humans also bewilders us.