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Single Idea 7928

[from 'Varieties of Things' by Cynthia Macdonald, in 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects ]

Full Idea

One common argument to the conclusion that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is false is that it is not necessarily true.

Gist of Idea

The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true

Source

Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2 n32)

Book Reference

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.75


A Reaction

This sounds like a good argument. If you test the Principle with an example ('this butler is the murderer') then total identity does not seem to necessitate identity, though it strongly implies it (the butler may have a twin etc).