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Single Idea 8127

[from 'Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000' by Tyler Burge, in 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism ]

Full Idea

Certain thought experiments made trouble for standard functionalism, which limits input/output to the surface of an individual; proposals to extend this into the environment reduces the reliance on a computer paradigm, but increases complexity.

Gist of Idea

Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like)

Source

Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.454)

Book Reference

Burge,Tyler: 'Foundations of the Mind' [OUP 2007], p.454


A Reaction

[He has the Twin Earth experiment in mind] The jury is out on this, but it looks a bit of a slippery slope. Accounts of action and responsibility need a fairly sharp concept of an individual. Externalism begins to look like just a new scepticism.