back to ideas for this text


Single Idea 8301

[from 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' by E.J. Lowe, in 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment ]

Full Idea

Some abstract objects, notably certain universals, need to be invoked for explanatory purposes, even if it cannot be said that they themselves possess causal powers or enter into causal relations.

Gist of Idea

Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.213


A Reaction

I am unconvinced that an entity with no causal powers could be any kind of explanation, given that, by definition, it can't do anything. You would have to think that the world of pure reason functioned without the aid of causal powers.