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Single Idea 8313

[from 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' by E.J. Lowe, in 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected ]

Full Idea

Facts seem to be indispensable as truth-makers and perhaps as causal relata, ..but if we must only include in our ontology things for which we can state a criterion of identity (Quine), ..we seem to be faced with a dilemma.

Gist of Idea

Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11)

Book Reference

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.228


A Reaction

Lowe proposes to relax the identification requirement (see Idea 8312). This seems a good strategy. An awful lot of strange philosophy arises from insisting on strict conditions for our understanding, and then finding everywhere failure to achieve it.

Related Idea

Idea 8312 It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe]