Full Idea
Against the view that causation is a particular physical process, might it not be argued that the concept of causation is the concept of a relation that possesses a certain intrinsic nature, so that causation must be the same in all possible worlds?
Gist of Idea
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process
Source
Michael Tooley (Causation and Supervenience [2003], 5.4)
Book Reference
'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.418
A Reaction
This makes the Humean assumption that laws of nature might be wildly different. I think it is perfectly possible that physical processes are the only way that causation could occur. Alternatively, the generic definition of 'cause' is just very vague.