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Single Idea 8399

[from 'Causation and Supervenience' by Michael Tooley, in 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation ]

Full Idea

A given type of state may be causally efficacious, but not as efficacious as an alternative states, so it is not true that even a direct cause need raise the probability of its effect.

Clarification

'Efficacious' means highly likely to have the effect

Gist of Idea

The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one

Source

Michael Tooley (Causation and Supervenience [2003], 6.2.4)

Book Reference

'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.424


A Reaction

My intuition is that explaining causation in terms of probabilities entirely misses the point, which mainly concerns explaining the sense of necessitation in a cause. This idea give me a good reason for my intuition.