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Single Idea 8712

[from 'Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics' by Michèle Friend, in 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics ]

Full Idea

Central to naturalism about mathematics are 'indispensability arguments', to the effect that some part of mathematics is indispensable to our best physical theory, and therefore we ought to take that part of mathematics to be true.

Gist of Idea

Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory

Source

Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 6.1)

Book Reference

Friend,Michèle: 'Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics' [Acumen 2007], p.128


A Reaction

Quine and Putnam hold this view; Field challenges it. It has the odd consequence that the dispensable parts (if they can be identified!) do not need to be treated as true (even though they might follow logically from the dispensable parts!). Wrong!