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Single Idea 8785

[from 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)' by Gottlob Frege, in 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought ]

Full Idea

In Frege's 'Grundlagen' objects, as distinct from entities of other types (properties, relations, or various functions), just are what (actual or possible) singular terms refer to.

Gist of Idea

For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by B Hale / C Wright - Logicism in the 21st Century 2

Book Reference

'Oxf Handbk of Philosophy of Maths and Logic', ed/tr. Shapiro,Stewart [OUP 2007], p.171


A Reaction

This seems to be the key claim that results in twentieth century metaphysics being done through analysis of language. The culmination is, of course, a denial of metaphysics, and then an eventual realisation that Frege was wrong.