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Single Idea 9154

[from 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)' by Gottlob Frege, in 4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL ]

Full Idea

Frege maintained a sophisticated version of the Euclidean position that knowledge of the axioms and theorems of logic, geometry, and arithmetic rests on the self-evidence of the axioms, definitions, and rules of inference.

Gist of Idea

Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority Intro

Book Reference

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.11


A Reaction

I am inclined to agree that they are indeed self-evident, but not in a purely a priori way. They are self-evident general facts about how reality is and how (it seems) that it must be. It seems to me closer to a perception than an insight.