back to ideas for this text


Single Idea 9375

[from 'Analyticity Reconsidered' by Paul Boghossian, in 5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth ]

Full Idea

Conventualism is a factualist view: it presupposes that sentences of logic have truth values. It differs from a realist view in its conception of the source of those truth values, not on their existence. I call the denial of truths Non-Factualism.

Gist of Idea

Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source

Source

Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III)

Book Reference

-: 'Nous' [-], p.13


A Reaction

It barely seems to count as truth is we say 'p is true because we say so'. It is a truth about an agreement, not a truth about logic. Driving on the left isn't a truth about which side of the road is best.