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Single Idea 9489

[from 'Nature's Metaphysics' by Alexander Bird, in 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims ]

Full Idea

The straightforward dispositional essentialist account of laws by subjunctive conditionals is false because dispositions typically suffer from finks and antidotes.

Clarification

Subjunctive conditionals say 'If x were the case..'

Gist of Idea

Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions

Source

Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 3.4)

Book Reference

Bird,Alexander: 'Nature's Metaphysics' [OUP 2007], p.64


A Reaction

[Finks and antidotes intervene before a disposition can take effect] This seems very persuasive to me, and shows why you can't just explain laws as counterfactual or conditional claims. Explanation demands what underlies them.