Full Idea
'We've crossed the Equator' is judged true if we are nearer the other Pole, so it not for philosophers to deny that the Earth has an equator, and we see that the Equator is not a concept or relation or function, so it must be classified as an object.
Gist of Idea
'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object
Source
Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.15)
Book Reference
Dummett,Michael: 'Frege: philosophy of mathematics' [Duckworth 1991], p.187
A Reaction
A lovely example of linguistic philosophy in action (and so much the worse for that, I would say). A useful label here, I suggest (unoriginally, I think), is that we should label such an item a 'semantic object', rather than a real object in our ontology.