display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
| 5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is a department of logic. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Personally I would invert that. Philosophy is concerned with human rationality, of which precise logic appears to be a rather limited subdivision. I see philosophy as the 'master' subject, not the 'servant' subject (as Locke had implied). |
| 5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: We can overthrow speculative philosophy, and see that the function of philosophy is wholly critical. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to imply that we CAN speculate, which appeared to be rendered impossible by the verification principle. Personally I think speculation is central to philosophy, but Ayer should always stand as a warning against bogus truth-claims. |
| 21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too. |
| 7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Thinkers from Hume to the logical positivists took exception to Kant's view that some synthetic propositions could be known a priori, and so rejected the possibility of metaphysics as Kant conceived of it. | |
| From: report of A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: See Idea 7918 for Kant's epistemological view of metaphysics. This strikes me as a big misunderstanding by empiricists, even though they are quite right to insist on evidence and proof. Metaphysics is essential, but its excess is the worst nonsense. |
| 5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Critics say an analyst is obliged by his atomistic metaphysics to regard an object consisting of parts a, b, c and d in a distinctive configuration as being simply a+b+c+d, and thus giving an entirely false account of its nature. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Ayer refers the critics to gestatl psychology. Personally I prefer to talk about the ontology rather than the psychology. If we include (as Russell suggests) relations as part of the analysis, there seems to be no problem. |
| 5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
| Full Idea: If there are any questions which science leaves it to philosophy to answer, a straightforward process of elimination must lead to their discovery. | |
| From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This is characteristic of the feeble-mindedness that British philosophy slipped into in the age of Wittgenstein, and for a while thereafter. Personally I regard scientists as servants, who are sent off on exploratory errands, and must report back. |