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Ideas for 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics', 'Existentialism: an introduction' and 'Phaedrus'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
162 Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Do you think it possible to form an adequate conception of the nature of an individual soul without considering the nature of soul in general?
     From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 270c)
     A reaction: Do animals understand anything (as opposed to simply being aware of things)?
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
160 The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato]
     Full Idea: When I believe that I have found in anyone the ability to discuss unity and plurality as they exist in the nature of things, I follow his footsteps as if he was a god.
     From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 266b)
     A reaction: This sounds like the problem of identity, which is at the heart of modern metaphysics.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
21959 Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
166 A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato]
     Full Idea: A speaker must be able to define a subject generically, and then to divide it into its various specific kinds until he reaches the limits of divisibility.
     From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 277b)
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
20744 Phenomenologists say all experience is about something and is directed [Aho]
     Full Idea: Phenomenologists agree that all experience has an intentional structure, that is, my experience is always about or of something; it is always directed towards an object.
     From: Kevin Aho (Existentialism: an introduction [2014], 2 'Phenomenology')
     A reaction: I am just beginning to grasp that the analytic debates about perception are a re-enactment of the Kantian debates about the thing-in-itself. This is the sort of idea you find in McDowell. Presumably the idea denies the Given, and raw sense-data.