19693
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There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding) [Aristotle, by Whitcomb]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle takes wisdom to come in two forms, the practical and the theoretical, the former of which is good judgement about how to act, and the latter of which is deep knowledge or understanding.
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From:
report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Dennis Whitcomb - Wisdom Intro
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A reaction:
The interesting question is then whether the two are connected. One might be thoroughly 'sensible' about action, without counting as 'wise', which seems to require a broader view of what is being done. Whitcomb endorses Aristotle on this idea.
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15209
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Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
Just as the tiniest error in navigation may lead to a landfall even on the wrong continent, so the acceptance of apparently innocuous principles can lead to doctrines which, if accepted, would render intellectual life impossible.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A)
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A reaction:
If one lived life by an axiom system, and one of the axioms was a bit off kilter, then this idea would be a powerful one. Note that it is only 'intellectual' life that is screwed up, but even there a plurality of ideas keep correcting one another.
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15212
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Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
Adequate accounts of those concepts which are neither purely formal nor simply psychological can be achieved by attention to ....the content of our knowledge, content which goes beyond the reports of immediate experience.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A)
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A reaction:
I like this one. Most proponents of analysis are either bogged down in trying to reduce all of our talk to formal logic, or else they think that they are just analysing how we think. It's neither, because the concepts arise from the world.
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15210
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Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The Humean view has led philosophers to suppose that their task is to provide an analysis of key concepts and relations wholly in terms drawn from formal logic, since relations of necessity are, in their view, fundamentally logical relations
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.I.A)
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A reaction:
A very sharp observation about why logic has become central to contemporary philosophy. As far as I can see, logic steadily increases its dominance, to the point where ordinary metaphysical thought is being squeezed out.
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