display all the ideas for this combination of texts
17 ideas
| 548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Knowledge chosen for itself and for the sake of knowledge is wisdom, more than that which is chosen for results. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0982a12) | |
| A reaction: Well something has to be for its own sake! But what about trivial knowledge? That question led Plato to the Forms. |
| 11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle characterises wisdom as a search for explanations (aitiai, which can also be translated as 'causes') and explanatory knowledge (epistemé, knowledge why something is as it is). | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Bk 01.2) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.1 | |
| A reaction: I think this idea might be a key one for modern philosophers, if they are searching for a metaphysics which can be integrated with modern science. |
| 545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If a doctor were to have a theoretical account without experience, knowing the universal but not the immediate particular, he will often err in treatment. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a25) | |
| A reaction: But acquaintance with particulars isn't the same as knowledge, which may require universals. |
| 18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: If philosophy were a matter of choice between rival theories, then it would be sound to teach it historically. But if it is not, then it is a fault to teach it historically, because it is quite unnecessary; we can tackle the subject direct. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C V A) | |
| A reaction: Wittgenstein was a bit notorious for not knowing the history of the subject terribly well, and this explains why. Presumably our tackling the subject direct will not have the dreadful consequence of producing yet another theory. |
| 549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All men begin to philosophise from wonder, for example at the changes of the sun, or the incommensurability of the diameter (pi) | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0983a14) | |
| A reaction: If it doesn't begin with wonder, what does it begin with? |
| 1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each of us is able to give a logos about some part of nature and even though as individuals little or nothing is added to the truth, from all of us contributing together something grand comes about. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0993b04) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle sees philosophy and science as group activities. |
| 609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1059a13) | |
| A reaction: So is philosophy just part of science - the bit that tries to explain the abstract instead of the physical? |
| 624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1074b28) | |
| A reaction: Connects to the apparently unique human ability to reflect about our own thoughts. |
| 572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy differs from dialectic in the manner of its powers, and from sophistry in the choice of life that it involves. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1004b17) | |
| A reaction: Note the separation of dialectic from the heart of philosophy, and the claim that philosophy is a way of life. |
| 22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1026a28) | |
| A reaction: For Aristotle science is mainly finding the causes of everything. Does he think physical science is the way to study ethics and politics. Maybe, via essential natures and natural functions. |
| 11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom is knowledge having to do with certain principles [archas] and causes [aitias]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0982a02) |
| 12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle says that 'humans all desire by nature to understand'. The Greek word here is often translated as 'to know', but this can be misleading. It is not a piling up of known facts, ..but mastery of a field of knowledge, and explaining why. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0980a22) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: I take this gloss of Annas's to be highly significant if we are trying to understand Aristotle, since it appears to be the single most significant remark from him of what his life's work was about. |
| 18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is the attempt to be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement. This 'philosophical' puzzlement is one of the intellect and not of instinct. Philosophical puzzles are irrelevant to our every-day life. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], A I.1) | |
| A reaction: All enquiry begins with puzzles, and they are cured by explanations, which result in understanding. In that sense he is right. I entirely disagree that the puzzles are irrelevant to daily life. |
| 559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We should not only be grateful to those in whose opinions we at all share but also to those who have gone astray, for even the latter have contributed something. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0993b12) | |
| A reaction: Yes, but what have they contributed? Have they revealed lines of reasoning, or are they just a terrible warning? |
| 18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers as 'Why?' and 'What?' without knowing clearly what their questions are. They are expressing a feeling of mental uneasiness. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B I.1) | |
| A reaction: He suggests it is childish to express puzzlement, instead of asking for precise information. How odd. All enquiries start with vague puzzlement, which gradually comes into focus, or else is abandoned. |
| 18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It is nonsense to try to find a theory of truth, because we can see that in everyday life we use the word quite clearly and definitely in various different senses. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C V B) | |
| A reaction: This was a year before Tarski published his famous theory of truth for formal languages. Prior to that, most philosophers were giving up on truth. Would he say the same about 'gravity' or 'inflation'? |
| 18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In philosophy we know already all that we want to know; philosophical analysis does not give us any new facts. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B V.1) |