display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
78 | Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1141b03) | |
A reaction: Precious for what? Theoretical or practical? Note the implied rational and empirical routes to wisdom. |
5248 | Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Wisdom studies none of the things that go to make a man happy, because it is not concerned with any kind of process. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1143b20) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very Platonic view, and not really consistent with Aristotle's overall metaphysics. It strikes me as simply wrong. Maybe all of reality is a process, and wisdom is then a maximum understanding of that process. |
2682 | Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Aristotle believes, in short, that human life is not important enough for humans to spend their lives on. | |
From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Thomas Nagel - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.12 | |
A reaction: The explanation of why Aristotle values contemplation more highly than the moral virtues. |
103 | Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The wise man can practise contemplation by himself (though no doubt he does it better with fellow-workers). | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177a32) | |
A reaction: It is hard to argue with this balanced view of the individual versus team concept of philosophy. |
20435 | If philosophy could be summarised it would be pointless [Adorno] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is in essence not summarisable. Otherwise it would be superfluous; that most of it allows its to be summarised speaks against it. | |
From: Theodor W. Adorno (Negative Dialectics [1966], p.34), quoted by Gerhard Richter - Benjamin and Adorno 3 | |
A reaction: This seems contradict the Cicero quotation which I take to be the epigraph of my collection of ideas. Adorno has a very 'continental' view, placing philosophy much closer to poetry (Heidegger's later view) than to science. Not like advocacy either. |
112 | Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Most people are readier to submit to compulsion and punishment than to argument and fine ideals. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1180a05) | |
A reaction: How perceptively pessimistic. We must hope that the picture has changed now that we have fairly universal education. Some people may submit to argument, but NOT to fine ideals. |
22 | Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is the mark of the trained mind never to expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature of that subject permits. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094b18) | |
A reaction: An excellent remark in the context of moral philosophy. There is a dream that moral principles might derive from pure reason, or consist of a single rule expressible in a few words, but daily life isn't like that, and morality is not likely to be. |
76 | The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139b24) | |
A reaction: This is diametrically opposed to the Humean view, which takes the nature of each thing, and the laws which guide it, to be contingent. Kripke has pointed us towards necessities in nature. |