Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Representation and Reality' and 'Constitutional Code I'

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2 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam]
     Full Idea: It is the job of the philosopher to distinguish what is fact and what is convention in our theorising about the world.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §7 p.112)
     A reaction: This may well be the entire truth about philosophy. It begins with the Nomos-Physis debate in ancient Athens, and it turns out to be the key issue in almost every area of metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics and morality.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15)
     A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs.