Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy' and 'Universals and Particulars'

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Every philosophy originates as a manifestation of its time; its origin presupposes its historical time.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.59)
     A reaction: There seems to be widespread agreement among continental philosophers about this idea, whereas analytic philosophers largely ignore, and treat Plato as if he were a current professor in Chicago.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Plato in writing is only a means for me; that which is primary and a priori, that which is the ground to which all is ultimately referred, is understanding.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy [1839], p.63)
     A reaction: It always seems to that the main aim of philosophy is understanding - which is why its central activity is explanation.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15)
     A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs.