display all the ideas for this combination of texts
17 ideas
| 548 | Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Knowledge chosen for itself and for the sake of knowledge is wisdom, more than that which is chosen for results. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0982a12) | |
| A reaction: Well something has to be for its own sake! But what about trivial knowledge? That question led Plato to the Forms. |
| 11228 | Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle characterises wisdom as a search for explanations (aitiai, which can also be translated as 'causes') and explanatory knowledge (epistemé, knowledge why something is as it is). | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], Bk 01.2) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.1 | |
| A reaction: I think this idea might be a key one for modern philosophers, if they are searching for a metaphysics which can be integrated with modern science. |
| 9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: If a person has wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for eternity. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Pierre Hadot - Philosophy as a way of life 8 | |
| A reaction: [Hadot quotes Plutarch 'On Common Conceptions' 8,1062a] This makes it sound awfully like some sort of Buddhist 'enlightenment', which strikes like lightning. He does wisdom recognise itself - by a warm glow, or by the cautious thought that got you there? |
| 545 | It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If a doctor were to have a theoretical account without experience, knowing the universal but not the immediate particular, he will often err in treatment. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a25) | |
| A reaction: But acquaintance with particulars isn't the same as knowledge, which may require universals. |
| 20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The wise man will participate in politics unless something prevents him, for he will restrain vice and promote virtue. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.121 | |
| A reaction: [from lost On Ways of Life Bk 1] We have made modern politics so hostile for its participants, thanks to cruel media pressure, that the best people now run a mile from it. Disastrous. |
| 549 | All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All men begin to philosophise from wonder, for example at the changes of the sun, or the incommensurability of the diameter (pi) | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0983a14) | |
| A reaction: If it doesn't begin with wonder, what does it begin with? |
| 1576 | If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each of us is able to give a logos about some part of nature and even though as individuals little or nothing is added to the truth, from all of us contributing together something grand comes about. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0993b04) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle sees philosophy and science as group activities. |
| 609 | Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1059a13) | |
| A reaction: So is philosophy just part of science - the bit that tries to explain the abstract instead of the physical? |
| 624 | Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1074b28) | |
| A reaction: Connects to the apparently unique human ability to reflect about our own thoughts. |
| 572 | Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy differs from dialectic in the manner of its powers, and from sophistry in the choice of life that it involves. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1004b17) | |
| A reaction: Note the separation of dialectic from the heart of philosophy, and the claim that philosophy is a way of life. |
| 22171 | If only natural substances exist, science is first philosophy - but not if there is an immovable substance [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1026a28) | |
| A reaction: For Aristotle science is mainly finding the causes of everything. Does he think physical science is the way to study ethics and politics. Maybe, via essential natures and natural functions. |
| 20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: There are three kinds of philosophical theorems, logical, ethical, and physical; of these the logic should be placed first, ethics second, and physics third (and theology is the final topic in physics). | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1035a | |
| A reaction: [in his lost 'On Lives' Bk 4] 'Theology is the final topic in physics'! That should create a stir in theology departments. Is this an order of study, or of importance? You come to theology right at the end of your studies. |
| 16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The maxim of honesty: never put forward a philosophical theory that you yourself cannot believe in your least philosophical and most commonsensical moments. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 2.8) | |
| A reaction: I take it as important that this test is according to the philosopher's commonsense, and not according to some populist idea. This would allow, for example, for commonsense to be sensitive to scientific knowledge, or awareness of the logic. |
| 11242 | Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom is knowledge having to do with certain principles [archas] and causes [aitias]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0982a02) |
| 12038 | Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know') [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle says that 'humans all desire by nature to understand'. The Greek word here is often translated as 'to know', but this can be misleading. It is not a piling up of known facts, ..but mastery of a field of knowledge, and explaining why. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0980a22) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: I take this gloss of Annas's to be highly significant if we are trying to understand Aristotle, since it appears to be the single most significant remark from him of what his life's work was about. |
| 559 | Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We should not only be grateful to those in whose opinions we at all share but also to those who have gone astray, for even the latter have contributed something. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0993b12) | |
| A reaction: Yes, but what have they contributed? Have they revealed lines of reasoning, or are they just a terrible warning? |
| 16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: The object of analysis is to reduce our burden of primitive notions, and to make tacit understanding explicit - not to bootstrap ourselves into understanding what we didn't understand at all beforehand. | |
| From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: I am particularly keen on the idea of 'making tacit understanding explicit'. I connect this with faith in intuition, and with the coherence view of justification. |