display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
9217 | Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman] |
Full Idea: The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices. | |
From: M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003]) | |
A reaction: I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there. |
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: We must allow ordinary speech to use inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. We speak of digging a well or weaving a cloak, but there is no well or cloak when they are being dug or woven. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.129) | |
A reaction: Nice examples. The imprecision is reduced if I say I am creating a well, because that implies something that is not yet complete. If I say I intend to dig a well, is that imprecise because the well does not exist? |