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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Vagueness and Contradiction' and 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]'

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2 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason.
     From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15)
     A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!).
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]
     Full Idea: The paradox of analysis says if a conceptual analysis states exactly what the original statement says, then the analysis is trivial; if it says something different from the original, then the analysis is mistaken. All analyses are trivial or false.
     From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 8.5)
     A reaction: [source is G.E. Moore] Good analyses typically give explanations, or necessary and sufficient conditions, or inferential relations. At their most trivial they at least produce a more profound dictionary than your usual lexicographer. Not guilty.