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3 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
Full Idea: Philosophy says it is not right even to stretch out a finger without some reason. | |
From: Epictetus (fragments/reports [c.57], 15) | |
A reaction: The key point here is that philosophy concerns action, an idea on which Epictetus is very keen. He rather despise theory. This idea perfectly sums up the concept of the wholly rational life (which no rational person would actually want to live!). |
16395 | Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker] |
Full Idea: Kripke's contribution was not to connect metaphysical and semantic issues, but to separate them: to provide a context in which questions about essences of things could be posed independently of assumptions about semantic rules of reference. | |
From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Reference and Necessity Intro | |
A reaction: In other words, Kripke set metaphysics free from the tyranny of Quine, and facilitated its modern rebirth. Bravo. |
17034 | Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke] |
Full Idea: Philosophical analyses of some concept like reference, in completely different terms which make no mention of reference, are very apt to fail. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2) | |
A reaction: Kripke consistently criticises analysic, and philosophical 'theories'. It is why he wanted a 'direct' theory of reference, with just you and the object. |